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WHEN MUSEUMS ACT LIKE GIFT SHOPS:
THE DISCORDANT DERIVATIVE WORKS
EXCEPTION TO THE TERMINATION CLAUSE
Jill I. Prater*
1. INTRODUCTION
American law has a long history of protecting the economic interests
of artists and authors. The Constitution, for example, empowers Congress
to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries."' This Article will discuss how
copyright law implements the policy of protecting the economic rights of
artists. Based on this underlying policy of copyright, this Article argues
that the derivative works exception to the termination clause2 of the
Copyright Act of 19763 should not apply to purely commercial derivative
works such as posters and notecards commonly sold by museum gift stores.
The market for reproductions of fine art and derivative works, such as
those found in museum gift shops, is a lucrative one. For the fiscal year
1993-1994, the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art had gross sales of
$82 million.4 That figure included $28.7 million in sales in the main
building, $22.7 million in sales through mail-order catalogs, $22.8 million
through satellite stores, and $7.8 million through wholesale sales.
5
Similarly, the Boston Museum of Fine Arts had an impressive year in
sales with an estimated $35 million in revenue from the catalog, shops, and
wholesale in 1994.6 Even exhibitions at smaller museums profit from sales
of derivative works. An exhibit including works by Cezanne and Matisse
at the Art Gallery of Ontario "rang up nearly $4 million ($5.6 million
* B.A., University of Louisville, 1991; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1995.
1. U.S. CONST. art. i, § 8, cl. 8.
2. 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1) (1994).
3. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1994).
4. Telephone Interview with Valerie Troyanski, Manager of Merchandising Activities, The
Metropolitan Museum of Art (Apr. 12, 1995).
5. Id.
6. Telephone Interview with Susan Russell, Director of Product Sales and Marketing,
Boston Museum of Fine Arts (Apr. 12, 1995).
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Canadian) in sales of T-shirts, posters and other memorabilia. 7 Many of
the larger museums have their own production facilities to control quality
and increase profits.8  Selling reproductions in the form of posters,
notecards, and T-shirts is definitely big business for museums.9
The typical troublesome scenario is one in which an unestablished
artist is fortunate enough to have a museum interested in purchasing a piece
of her work. In this situation, an artist may be unaware of what rights she
has under copyright law for her work.'0 Due to this lack of legal education
and weak bargaining position, the artist may sign whichever contract the
museum presents to her. This contract usually confers all rights in the
work to the museum. For example, the following sample contract l I clearly
intends to favor museums:
I. Transfer of Copyright
In consideration of the Acquisition by (name of museum) of my
(medium) entitled I hereby relinquish and
transfer to the said (name of museum) all my right, title and
interest in copyright which I have or may be deemed to have in
said work and more particularly transfer the exclusive rights of
reproduction, adaptation and distribution to said (name of
museum).
(Witness, Seal for Notary, and Comment Omitted)
Terms and Conditions for Purchase of Works of Art
If this work has been copyrighted the museum will not purchase
it unless the vendor and the owner (in most cases the artist) of
the copyright interests of the rights of reproduction, adaptation,
7. Record numbers see Barnes Toronto exhibit, UPI, Jan. 6, 1995, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File.
8. Museum Licensors Focus on Home Furnishings, Licensing Letter, EPM
Communications, Inc., May 1, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2557092.
9. The author realizes that only a fraction of these sales would be affected by an artist's
ability to terminate a right to produce derivative works from a piece the artist sold to a museum
when she was younger and less well-known.
10. Sarah A. Smith, Note, The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act: Increased
Protection and Enhanced Status for Visual Artists, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 158, 165 n.40 (1984).
11. Nicholas D. Ward, Copyright in Museum Collections: An Overview of Some of the
Problems, 7 J.C. & U.L. 297, 317-20 (1980-81).
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and distribution agree to transfer the exclusive rights of
reproduction, adaptation and distribution to the museum ....
II. Deed of Conveyance and Dedication
This Deed of Conveyance and Dedication is made this _ day
of in the year one thousand nine hundred and
(19__) by and between (name of artist and address)
hereinafter known as the First Party and (name of museum and
address) hereinafter known as the Second Party.
WITNESSETH, That in consideration of the Second Party's
agreement to display the hereinafter enumerated work publicly,
for a period to be determined by the Second Party, and to
distribute such reproductions of said work as Second Party may
wish to produce, when and as it may appear appropriate to the
Second Party, the First Party does hereby grant, convey and
forever release unto the Second Party, absolutely, the following
described pictorial, graphic or sculptural property:
together with all rights privileges and
appurtenances thereunto appertaining, including any and all
copyright interests in said work which First Party has or may be
deemed to have, including more particularly the rights of
reproduction, adaptation, distribution and display....
Comments:
1 ... If for any reason the artist's waiver of right is found
inoperative, the deed in the alternative transfers exclusive
rights to the museum....12
As this sample contract demonstrates, the artist is required to transfer
all possible interests in the work to the museum.1 3  In exchange, the
12. Id.
13. The author recognizes that not all museums require such onerous contracts transferring
all copyright interest to the museum. The Smithsonian Institution is probably a good example,
although its policies may be reflective of its overall educational mission. Interview with Ronald
F. Cuffe, Manager, Revenue, Concessions and Business Activity, Office of Contracting and
Property Management, Smithsonian Institution, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 25, 1994); Interview
with Billie Munroe, Contract Negotiator, Revenue, Concessions and Business Activity, Office of
Contracting and Property Management, Smithsonian Institution, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 25,
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museum merely agrees to display the work for a period of time solely at its
discretion. Notwithstanding the difficult legal jargon, this one-sided
contract is also being negotiated between a museum agent experienced in
making contracts and an artist, who is usually unaware of the legal rights
pertaining to her work.
14
In light of the purely commercial nature of this enterprise, this Article
argues that derivative works of the type currently sold in museum gift
shops should not be exempt from the termination clause of the Copyright
Act of 1976. Part II examines the underlying policy and history of the
1909 and 1976 copyright acts. Part III focuses on the nature of derivative
works and their history in conjunction with the termination clause of the
Copyright Act of 1976. This section of the Article then discusses related
copyright issues and finds an underlying rationale to protect the economic
interests of artists. Part IV explores the doctrine of fair use, citing recent
cases as examples of this policy in action. Part V covers the United States
concept of resale royalties and the European droit de suite. Part VI
discusses the issues and arguments in the current American debate over
moral rights for artists. In conclusion, this Article suggests a change in the
current application of the termination clause.
II. THE POLICY UNDERLYING THE COPYRIGHT ACTS OF 1909 AND 1976
The Constitution grants Congress the authority to protect the
economic interests of the works of artists and authors. 15  The rationale
behind securing these economic interests is that artists and authors will
have an incentive to create if they are assured a "limited monopoly in the
fruits of their labors."'16  A secondary interest in preserving the limited
monopoly is that artists and authors will be given incentives "to publish
innovation[s] for the common good."'17  The Supreme Court explicitly
noted the economic basis of copyright in the landmark case Mazer v.
Stein,'8 stating: "[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
1994); Interview with Stephen E. Weil, Deputy Director, Hirshhorn Museum & Sculpture
Garden, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 26, 1994).
14. Smith, supra note 10, at 165 n.40.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. Virginia E. Lohmann, Note, The Errant Evolution of Termination of Transfer Rights and
the Derivative Works Exception, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 897, 898 (1981). But cf Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) ("The primary objective of copyright is not
to reward the labor of authors, but '[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.' Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8.").
17. See CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 66 (2d
Cir. 1994).
18. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
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Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
'Sciences and useful Arts." ' 19 Thus, the limited monopoly serves the dual
purposes of protecting an artist's economic interests and encouraging the
production of innovations for the public.
The Cop0right Act of 1976 (the "1976 Act" governs current
copyright law. Exclusive rights reserved to the artist are delineated in
§ 106 as follows:
Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright
under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize
any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures
and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic,
or sculptural works, including the individual images of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly.
22
These basic rights of reproduction, preparation of derivative works,
distribution of copies, public performance, and display clearly show the
intent to reserve to an artist a limited economic monopoly in the work. The
Copyright Act of 1909 (the "1909 Act"), while not as comprehensive as the
1976 Act, was an improvement compared to its predecessors because it
19. Id. at 219.
20. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810(1994).
21. Although these copyrights belong to various kinds of "authors" of copyrightable work,
this Article will refer primarily to artists with the understanding that the law does not single out
visual artists for treatment different from that of other artists, including literary artists or musical
artists.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
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increased the length of protection to twenty-eight years. In addition,
under the 1909 Act, an artist could choose to renew the copyright upon
expiration of a twenty-eight year term. The 1976 Act changed this renewal24 25
system to a set term system. The current term is defined as the life of
the artist plus an additional fifty years.26
The renewal provisions of the 1909 Act were drafted specifically to
protect the economic value of an artist's work that might not be recognized
until years after the artist had sacrificed her rights through contracting. The
legislative history of the 1909 Act illustrates this protective stance of the
legislators toward the artist:
It not infrequently happens that the author sells his copyright
outright to a publisher for a comparatively small sum. If the
work proves to be a great success and lives beyond the term of
twenty-eight years, your committee felt that it should be the
exclusive right of the author to take the renewal term ... so that
he could not be deprived of that right.7
Renewal terms were designed to protect unestablished artists who,
having relatively little bargaining power, may have struck imprudent
bargains at early points in their careers. Having a right in renewal was
thought to provide the artist or her heirs the ability to renegotiate for better
terms after the work had been exploited in the market.
2 8
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's holding in Fred Fisher Music Co.
v. M Witmark & Sons severely undermined the underlying concept of the
renewal provision. 29 In that case, the authors of the song When Irish Eyes
Are Smiling assigned both their original copyright and renewal rights in the
song to the publisher. The Court found that under the 1909 Act, the
authors were able to sign away their renewal rights during the original term
of the copyright. 3' This holding harmed those authors whom the 1909 Act
specifically sought to protect because it allowed them to waive their
23. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (repealed 1976). This version of the 1909 Act was replaced by the
comprehensive Copyright Act of 1976.
24. See 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970 & Supp. V 1974).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1994).
26. Id.
27. H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 14 (1909).
28. Daniel A. Saunders, Comment, Copyright Law's Broken Rear Window: An Appraisal of
Damage and Estimate of Repair, 80 CAL. L. REV. 179, 185 (1992).
29. 318 U.S. 643 (1943).
30. Id. at 645.
31. Id.
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economic interests permanently in the face of poor bargaining positions.
32
In response to the Fred Fisher holding,33 Congress eventually adopted the
1976 Act with the set term of the life of the artist plus an additional fifty
years.34 Other major influences in the decision to enact the 1976 Act
included the longer life span of people, and rapidly developing
communication technology, which expanded the commercial life span of
the works.
35
III. THE TERMINATION CLAUSE AND DERIVATIVE WORKS EXCEPTION
A. The Termination Clause
The termination clause of the Copyright Act of 1976 continues the
policy of protecting the economic rights of artists.36 The termination clause
allows artists who have assigned their copyrights in a work to reclaim those
rights by giving written notice to the copyright owner. This right to
terminate vests thirty-five years after the date of the assignment, during
which time the commercial value of the work has had a chance to be
exploited.37 The termination clause reads in pertinent part:
(a) CONDITIONS FOR TERMINATION-In the case of any work
other than a work made for hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive
grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of any right under a
copyright, executed by the author on or after January 1, 1978,
otherwise than by will, is subject to termination...
(3) Termination of the grant may be effected at any time
during a period of five years beginning at the end of thirty-
five years from the date of execution of the grant...
(4) The termination shall be effected by serving an
advance notice in writing...
(5) Termination of the grant may be effective
notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, including
an agreement to make a will or to make any future grant.
32. Lohmann, supra note 16, at 900-01.
33. Id. at 901.
34. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
35. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 47, 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5660,
5664.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1994).
37. Id.
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(b) Effect of Termination-Upon the effective date of
termination, all rights under this title that were covered by the
terminated grants revert to the author .... 38
The House Committee Report again noted Congress' intent to protect
artists from poor bargains:
[The termination provisions] are based on the premise that the
reversionary provisions of the [1909 Act] on copyright renewal
(17 U.S.C. § 24) should be eliminated, and that the proposed
law [1976 Act] should substitute for them a provision
safeguarding authors against unremunerative transfers. A
provision of this sort is needed because of the unequal
bargaining position of authors, resulting in part from the
impossibility of determining a work's value until it has been
exploited.
39
Specifically, Congress restricted the ability of artists, saddled with weaker
bargaining power, to waive future interests in their work through the
termination clause. By making this right non-waivable, Congress
reversed the unwise policy wrought by the Fred Fisher41 decision and
precluded this right from being taken to the bargaining table.
Additionally, the 1976 Act mooted a common law rule widely knownS42
as the Pushman presumption. In Pushman v. New York Graphic Society,
Inc.,43 the New York Court of Appeals held that there is a presumption
upon the sale or transfer of a copyrighted work that all the copyright
interests in that work were also conveyed with the original sale, whether
explicitly mentioned or not.44  Section 202 of the 1976 Act explicitly• 45
overturns that presumption. In fact, the House Committee Report refers
specifically to overruling the Pushman decision. 46 This statute only served
to further the economic interests of the unwitting artist selling her work,
but made no reference to the transfer of any copyrights to the buyer of such
work.
38. Id
39. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5739-40.
40. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (a)(5) (1994).
41. 318 U.S. 643 (1943).
42. MARIE C. MALARO, A LEGAL PRIMER ON MANAGING MUSEUM COLLECTIONS 115
(1985).
43. 39 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1942).
44. Id at 251.
45. MALARO, supra note 42, at 115 n.226.
46. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (i976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5739-40.
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B. The Derivative Works Exception
The termination clause of § 203 was a hard-won compromise.47
Professor Jessica Litman describes the tortuous negotiations that took place
over the entire 1976 Act between major players, such as the Motion Picture
Association of America; the American Society of Composers; Authors and
Publishers; the Authors League of America; the Music Publishers
Association of the United States; and the American Textbook Publishers
Institute.
48
The resulting termination clause carved out an exception for those
derivative works produced under the original grant of copyright. The
exception came to be known as the derivative works exception, and was
the subject of a particularly vociferous debate. The exception is embodied
in § 203 (b)(1):
A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before
its termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the
grant after its termination, but this privilege does not extend to
the preparation after the termination of other derivative works
based upon the copyrighted work covered by the terminated
grant.
51
Consider the lesser-known artist who sold her work to a museum,
along with all accompanying copyrights in the work. Under this clause, if
she later became famous and wished to terminate the original transfer of the
rights to prepare derivative works or reproductions to recoup the
commercial value from those rights, she could not stop the museum from
producing whatever derivative works it has already prepared.
The Motion Picture Association of America and other special interest
groups battled for the derivative works exception. 52 Movie producers wereprimarily concerned with purchasing a copyright in a story and making it
47. Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L.
REv. 857, 891-93 (1987).
48. Id. at 865-67. One may additionally note a prominent lack of representation of any such
organized voice for visual artists. To this author's knowledge, no such lobbying organization
exists for visual artists.
49. A derivative work is defined as "a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such
as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version,
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work
may be recast, transformed, or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
50. Litman, supra note 47, at 893.
51. 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1) (1994).
52. Litman, supra note 47, at 893.
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into a movie, only to pay exorbitant sums later, because the story's author
could terminate the copyright transfer and hold out during renegotiations.
53
Their concern was well-founded, because such a case actually
occurred with a copyright that was governed by the 1909 Act and its
renewal provisions. In Stewart v. Abend,54 producers of the movie Rear
Window owned the copyright to the story on which they based the motion
picture.55 Along with the original transfer of copyright, the parties also56
agreed to transfer the renewal term. The movie was made during the
original copyright term. 57 Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, held
that because the author of the story had died before the renewal rights had
vested, his statutory successors were entitled to the reversion of those
rights, notwithstanding the author's contract to transfer the renewal
rights. By protecting the author's right to renegotiate as provided by the
renewal rights, the Court found that the owners of the derivative work (the
producers) did not retain the right to continue exploiting the film.59 This
holding enforced Congress' intent to reserve future economic benefit to the
artist by creating the renewal term.
Congress addressed this same issue in §§ 203 and 304 of the 1976
Act. In the House Committee Report, Congress explained the operation
of § 304:
[U]nder the [1909 Act] renewal provisions, any statutory
beneficiary of the author can make a valid transfer or license of
future renewal rights, which is completely binding if the author
is dead and the person who executed the grant turns out to be the
proper renewal claimant. Because of this, a great many
contingent transfers of future renewal rights have been obtained
from widows, widowers, children and next of kin, and a
substantial number of these will be binding. After the present
twenty-eight year renewal period has ended, a statutory
53. Id.
54. 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
55. Id. at 212.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 207-08.
59. Id.
60. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304 (1994). Section 304 deals with the termination of transfer for
those works originally prepared under the 1909 Act and subject to renewal terms of copyright.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 140-41 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5756-57.
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beneficiary who has signed a disadvantageous grant of this sort
should have the opportunity to reclaim the extended term.
61
Here, Congress explicitly noted its intent to protect the economic interests
of authors in their works as well as the interests of their statutory
successors. Congress, however, also recognized the interests of owners of
the derivative works. Barbara Ringer, then Register of Copyrights,
explained:
[I]n fairness to the owner of the derivative work, and to avoid
depriving the public of access to derivative works in this
situation, a "derivative works exception" should be written into
both §§ 304 and 203. The purpose of the exception was to keep
the derivative work in circulation and not to deprive the owner
of the derivative work of the use of its own property. The sole
beneficiary of the exception was intended to be the owner of the
derivative work who wanted to continue utilizing it.
62
Thus, to give protection to both parties, the 1976 Act distinguishes the
copyright in the original work and the copyright in a derivative work as
follows:
The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only
to the material contributed by the author of such work, as
distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the
work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting
material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and
does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or
subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting
material.
63
Given these definitions, it is understandable why the motion picture
industry sought to protect its interests in producing films which are often
based on already copyrighted stories. A motion picture creates a new,
separately copyrightable work that requires authorship in the same sense as
the original story. 4 Indeed, the definition of derivative works in the 1976
61. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 140-41 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5756-
57 (emphasis added).
62. Lohmann, supra note 16, at 911.
63. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b)(1994).
64. See Saunders, supra note 28, at 190-96 (discussing rights of derivative works owners as
being subordinate to those of the original copyrights owner' versus a derivative work as having
"new-property-rights"). Christine Wallace, Note, Overlapping Interests in Derivative Works and
Compilations, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 103, 127 (1984) (discussing the requirement of
originality in derivative works).
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Act requires modifications to a degree amounting to original authorship.
65
Musical arrangements, dramatizations, fictionalizations, and motion
pictures based on the original work are examples of derivative works that
could contain the requisite original creativity.6 Based on that concept of
derivative works, one can understand the basis for the "separate
innovation" requirement of the derivative works exception. All would
agree that a classic film like Rear Window should not be archived merely
because the author who sold Alfred Hitchcock a novel refused to grant a
license. 67 This conflict of interests illustrates how the derivative works
exception can create a perverse outcome when viewed in light of the
copyright doctrine's intentions to protect the economic interests of an artist.
This Article suggests a small change comporting with the realities of
the fine art market, particularly with respect to derivative works produced
by museums. Most large museums have gift stores and catalogs that sell a
wide array of reproduced works6 8 including postcards, T-shirts, and
posters.69 Many people would recognize that these types of items require
no independent artistic authorship. With no independent creativity to
reward, the policy of copyright and the related doctrines of fair use, moral
rights, and droit de suite dictate that those purely commercial derivative
works not be exempted from the termination clause that allows artists to
retain the economic value of the original copyright interest in their work.
The courts have focused on the economic effect of derivative works
on the market for the original work. One approach the courts have taken
with respect to infringement cases focuses on the economic effects on the
work that the derivative work is allegedly infringing.7 1 In Midway
Manufacturing Co. v. Arctic International, Inc.,72 the court held that the
65. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
66. Id.
67. See Saunders, supra note 28, at 189-90.
68. Congress was aware that the rights to reproduce and to prepare derivative works were
quite similar and not very well defined in the statute. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 at 62 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5675 ("The exclusive right to prepare derivative works,
specified separately in clause (2) of section 106, overlaps the exclusive right of reproduction to
some extent.").
69. For example, the Boston Museum of Fine Arts includes in its Fall 1994 gift catalog a
poster reproducing a Janet Fish oil painting. Similarly, the Art Institute of Chicago sells
calendars based upon the work of Andy Warhol, notecards based upon the work of Georgia
O'Keefe and posters based on the work of Keith Haring.
70. Michael Wurzer, Note, Infringement of the Exclusive Right to Prepare Derivative
Works: Reducing Uncertainty, 73 MINN. L. REv. 1521, 1526-27 (1989).
71. Id. The other approach discussed focuses on whether the works are "substantially
similar."
72. 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983).
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exclusive right to prepare derivative works grants authors a limited
monopoly in all markets related to the work that generate a significant
demand. 73 This holding is consistent with the general copyright theory that
the artist, upon creation of the work, has the right to prepare derivative
works. By allowing an artist to derive income from these reproductions,
the policies of copyright law are furthered. These policies recognize that
granting an artist a limited monopoly encourages her to create because the
commercial value of her work is secured. Furthermore, these incentives
benefit the public by allowing them the enjoy the artist's new work.74
IV. THE FACTOR OF ECONOMIC EFFECT IN FAIR USE
The doctrine of fair use codifies the desire to reserve to an artist the
economic benefit of a work.75 While the doctrine of fair use is actually an
affirmative defense to an alleged infringement, it also recognizes the
economic effect that the alleged infringing work has on the original work's.... 76
market as a factor for determining infringement. The statute reads:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.
77
In the watershed case of Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises,78 the Supreme Court recognized the explicit nature of this
legislative command, and its logical correlation to the underlying purpose
of copyright law. In that case, Time magazine acquired a license to publish
excerpts of President Ford's memoirs but was scooped by The Nation
which secretly procured an advance copy of the book. 79 In holding that
73. Id. at 1013.
74. Wurzer, supra note 70, at 1530.
75. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
76. Id.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
79. Id. at 542.
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The Nation infringed the copyright, the Court noted that the fourth factor
regarding the effect on the potential market was "undoubtedly the single
most important element of fair use., 80 This unequivocal recognition of
economic effect as the most important factor in determining fair use
demonstrates the Court's understanding of the underlying objective of
copyright law as striving to protect the economic rights of authors.
Additionally, the language of the first factor refers to the economic
nature of the original and derivative works. 81 This part of the test requires
the trial court to consider the purpose and character of the work,
specifically whether the use could be characterized as commercial or non-" 82
profit. Moreover, Congress chose this language to guide interpreters of
the law by identifying this crucial consideration as key to the advancement
of the policy behind copyright law.
The Court in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
83
acting on this reasonably clear mandate, 84 established that the commercial
effects of works should be given significant weight in determining
infringement. Sony involved the video recording of copyrighted programs
from television for personal home use at a later time. This "time-shifting"
was held to be fair use under the § 107 factors. 85 As a result of the case,
courts began emphasizing the importance of the commercial versus non-
commercial nature of secondary works. The Court stated definitively,
"every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair
exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the
copyright ....... 86 This recognition of the importance of the economic
value of copyright ownership comports with the original theory of
copyright. Where a museum produces derivative works such as posters and
T-shirts (commercial products with no artistic value of their own apart from
the original work), the derivative works exception does not promote the
economic interests of the artist. The exception does not give incentives the
80. Id. at 566.
81. Id. at 562.
82. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1994).
83. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
84. But see Lloyd L. Weinreb, Lecture to Intellectual Property Seminar at Harvard Law
School (Apr. 20, 1995) [hereinafter Weinreb, Lecture] (arguing that in fact the 1976 Copyright
Act is anything but clear and that the examples of commercial nature versus non-profit use should
be read as exemplary and not determinative); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the
Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV L. REv. 1137, 1139, 1151 (1990) [hereinafter Weinreb, Fair's
Fair] (referring to the doctrine of fair use as "confusion compounded," a "muddled statutory
provision," and a "botched job").
85. Sony, 464 U.S. at 420, 454-55.
86. Id. at451.
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artist to create, or to act in accordance with the themes codified by the fair
use doctrine.
Since Sony, the Court has retreated from the absolutist viewpoint that
all commercial works presumptively infringe upon the original work. The
Court has, however, not abandoned the idea that the commercial nature of
the work is central to the fair use determination. A year after Sony, the
Court in Harper & Row 8 7 continued to advance the commercial versus non-
profit distinction stating, "[t]he crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is
not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the
user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without
paying the customary price.
88
In 1994, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,89 the Court
pronounced its latest view on the commercial nature of works. The Court
found that the appellate court did not place enough emphasis on factors• 90
other than the commercial character of the parody. Although the case
was remanded for consideration of the additional factors under § 107, the
Court reaffirmed that the first and fourth factors, that is, the nature of the
use and economic effect on the market, are integral to the fair useS • 91
determination. The Court distinguished Sony by reasoning that the
presumption of infringement, if used for commercial purposes, was
applicable in cases of wholesale copying as in Sony (although there were
also noncommercial purposes), 92 but not necessarily in parodies where the
use has been transformative.9 3 Focusing on the issue of whether the work
was a transformative use of the copyrighted material, the Court noted
"when ... the second use is transformative, market substitution is at least
less certain, and market harm may not be so readily inferred."
94
The Court relied, at least in part, upon the scholarship of Judge Pierre
N. Leval defining the concept of transformative use. 95 Leval suggests this
factor depends upon the extent of the transformative use:
87. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
88. Id. at 562.
89. 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (addressing 2 Live Crew's parody of Roy Orbison's "Oh, Pretty
Woman").
90. Id. at 583-84.
91. Id.
92. But see Weinreb, Fair's Fair, supra note 84, at 1154 (challenging home-recording as a
noncommercial purpose).
93. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 ("transformation" is the use of a copyrighted work to create
new independent artistic value).
94. Id. at 591.
95. Id at 591 n.21.
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I believe the answer to the question of justification [of the first
factor] turns primarily on whether, and to what extent, the
challenged use is transformative. The use must be productive
and must employ the quoted matter in a different manner or for a
different purpose from the original... [i]f... the secondary use
adds value to the original-if the quoted matter is used as raw
material, transformed in the creation of new information, new
aesthetics, new insights and understandings-this is the very
type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for
the enrichment of society.
6
It is this understanding of transformation which supports the
derivative works exception, especially in the case of motion pictures. This
exception, heavily lobbied for by the Motion Picture Association of
America, makes sense in this medium since a film inherently requires a
tremendous amount of original artistic work.
However, the idea that a derivative work may add value to the
original work of art is exactly what is lacking when museums replicate art
on notecards and posters. When one examines the types of products that
museums generally sell in their stores and catalogs, these purely
commercial items have no independent artistic value. The T-shirts, posters
or postcards do not embody a, "new information, new aesthetics, [or] new
insights and understandings" of the original work, which Judge Leval
highlighted as the value of transformative works. Because these museum
products lack any inherent artistic value independent of the original artist's
work, the policy arguments for protecting derivative works from the threat
of the termination clause do not exist. Instead, the purpose of the
termination clause is better served by allowing artists to renegotiate their
right to create derivative works when the derivative works produced by the
museum have no separate artistic value of their own.
Professor Lloyd Weinreb questions Judge Leval's reliance on the idea
that transformative use is the seminal inquiry.98 In response to two
decisions authored by Judge Leval, Professor Weinreb and Judge Leval
discussed and elaborated on the notion of transformative works.99 Both
Salinger v. Random House, Inc. 00 and New Era Publications International
96. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990)
(footnotes omitted).
97. Id.
98. Weinreb, Fair's Fair, supra note 84, at 1142.
99. Leval, supra note 96, at 1112-18. See generally Weinreb, Fair's Fair, supra note 84.
100. 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
890 (1987).
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v. Henry Holt & Co. ' involved written biographies which included sets of
quotations, some of which did not qualify as fair use. Regarding literary
works, Professor Weinreb's criticism of Judge Leval's confidence in the
promotion of the transformative use test is well-founded. It is difficult to
discern what criteria are involved in identifying a transformative use; as
such, the test does not alleviate Judge Leval's concerns as one would
expect from a bright-line test.
Within the realm of visual arts, on the other hand, determining what is
a transformative use is a more precise inquiry. A work of visual art
expresses its idea and message to the viewer only through its visual
element. The message remains the same when it is reproduced on a poster
or notecard. Examining the difference in purpose between a quotation in a
biography and a reproduced visual work on a poster one can see that the
quotation may have a different purpose from the original work. The poster,
by comparison, has the same function as that of the original piece hanging
in the museum.
It is conceivable that a museum might produce derivative works that
could have some transformed use or independent value. One example that
arguably has some independent merit is the reproduction of the central
figure in Edward Munch's The Scream in the form of a large blow-up doll.
Although this type of reproduction is clearly a commercial product with
more frivolous than serious overtones, it is possible to argue that there is
artistic merit in such a doll, especially in the post-modernist art movement.
Professor Weinreb explains the difficulty of relying on the "transformative
use" determination by noting other uses: "[a] use may serve an important,
socially useful purpose without being transformative, simply by making the
copied material available."' 0 2 This concern, while applicable in the context
of quotations in biographies, is not as relevant in the proposed situation of
derivative works produced by museums. Even if one were to argue that the
reproduction of a visual work on a T-shirt makes that piece of art more
accessible to a mass audience, the original piece of art will be on display
within the museum. Thus, there is no risk of foreclosing public access to
any given work of art. Indeed, by excluding commercial derivative works
created by museums under the derivative works exception, the public is not
deprived of access to the original works of art. In this way, the artist's
economic interest in her exploited work can be recouped. The economic
interests of the artist are preserved through the four fair use factors
101. 695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.
1989).
102. Weinreb, Fair's Fair, supra note 84, at 1143.
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enumerated in § 107, and the concept of the transformation of copyrighted
works into a secondary use with artistic or economic value of its own is
consistent with the fundamental policy of protecting the artist's monopoly
interest in her work, and maintaining incentives to create.
The most recent example of the tension between the idea of
transformative use and the commercial aspects of copyright in visual art
was captured in Rogers v. Koons.10 3 This case involved a sculpture created
by Jeff Koons, a postmodemist artist.' °4 The court found that the sculpture
infringed upon a photograph taken by Art Rogers of a man and woman
holding eight German Shepherd puppies. 10 5  Rogers initially took the
picture in 1980 and licensed it to be reproduced in notecard form in
1984.106 His picture, entitled "Puppies," was simply that of a woman and
man each holding four puppies in their arms.' 07 Koons, associated with the
postmodemist art era which includes the appropriation school of
thought, 1 8 purchased a copy of the picture in notecard form with the
thought in mind that he might draw upon it for inspiration for one of his
own shows. 109 Part of the philosophy underlying appropriation is that all
artistic work is in some way a derivative work drawn from the artists'
surroundings and life experiences." 
0
Koons went on to create a large sculpture that mimicked the picture.
The sculpture depicted a man and a woman with daisies strewn throughout
their hair seated on a bench holding blue puppies with large, circus clown-
like noses.I'1 In order to produce this work, Koons sent the notecard to his
artisans with instructions that they should create the sculpture "as per
photo."' 2 He included the sculpture, entitled "String of Puppies," in the
show "Banality" to illustrate the very commonplace and unoriginal image
103. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 934 (1992).
104. Telephone Interview with John B. Koegel, Attorney for Jeff Koons (July 22, 1994)
[hereinafter Interview with Koegel] (describing the case as a debate over whose rights are more
important: the expression of the artist, the rights of future artists, or the rights of society to have
access to a broad array of art).
105. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 304.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 309.
109. Id. at 305.
110. Interview with Koegel, supra note 104.
111. Willajeanne F. McLean, All's Not Fair in Art and War: A Look at the Fair Use
Defense After Rogers v. Koons, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 373 (1993).
112. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 305.
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popular in current culture. 113 Rogers later discovered that Koons had
apparently used the picture and brought suit.
11 4
The Second Circuit ultimately found that Koons' use of the notecard
infringed upon Rogers' copyright. 115  On the issue of copyright
infringement, Koons conceded that he had relied upon the picture in
fashioning his sculpture." 6  The court took this admission as direct
evidence of copyright infringement." 7 Koons went on to argue that while
he used the photograph, his use was acceptable under the fair use
doctrine.1 8 The court dismissed his argument that, as a postmodernist, his
work was meant as commentary or critique in the form of parody. The
court then explored the commercial nature of Koons' sculpture as part of
the discussion on the first factor. 119 One commentator suggests that the
court relied too heavily on the commercial nature of Koons' sculpture,
which was for sale at the "Banality" show:
In its review of the profit element of the first factor, the Second
Circuit seemed to be mesmerized by the commercial character of
the Koons sculpture. Although the court stated that the profit
element in the fair use calculus was not controlling, it
nevertheless found that Koons' "substantial" profit, realized
from the sales of the statues, weighed in Rogers' favor. In fact,
other commentators, in criticizing the court's interpretation of
commercial use, have noted that the court's interpretation
suggests that "anytime a work is sold, it will not be protected as
fair use .... ." Its opinion seems to fly in the face of the stricture
that the commercial purpose of the work should not traditionally
be controlling in the fair use calculus.' 
20
Under the fourth factor, the court also considered the economic effect of
the sculpture on the market for the original piece.' 21 Here, the court
determined that Koons' sculpture would in fact have a harmful effect on
Rogers' ability to sell the right to reproduce his work and to make
derivative works from his original photograph.1
22
113. Id. at 304-05.
114. Id. at 305.
115. Id. at 306.
116. Id. at 307.
117. Id.
118. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 308.
119. Id. at 308-09.
120. McLean, supra note I 11, at 402-03 (footnotes omitted).
121. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 311.
122. Id. at 312.
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Rogers strongly suggests that the protection provided by the 1976 Act
to preserve an artist's rights in reproduction and derivative works is
grounded in the policy of protecting the economic interests of the artist.
Even if one disagreed with the holding of this case, by taking issue with the
claim of Koons' sculpture impairing Rogers' market or some other reason,
it is clear that this decision revolved around protecting an artist's economic
interests. This philosophy, found throughout the field of copyright,
demonstrates that when an artist has granted rights to museums while at an
inferior bargaining position, the museum should not be able to continue
profiting from derivative works that have no artistic merit of their own.
V. DROIT DE SUITE
The European concept of droit de suite, translated from the French,
means imprecisely, "art proceeds right." 23 It refers to the right of an artist
to collect a portion of the resale price of the work and stems from the
theory that an artist should benefit from the increase in value of her work
over time. 124 Droit de suite parallels the underlying theory of United States
copyright law: protecting the economic interests of artists. Although many
foreign countries recognize droit de suite, the United States has not yet
accepted this right.'25 Professor Monroe Price delineated the concept:
[Droit de suite] is an expression of the belief that (1) the sale of
the artist's work at anything like its "true" value only comes late
in his life or after his death; (2) the postponement in value is
attributable to the lag in popular understanding and appreciation;
(3) therefore the artist is subsidizing the public's education with
his poverty; (4) this is an unfair state of affairs; (5) the artist
should profit when he is finally discovered by the newly
sophisticated market.1
26
This set of assumptions closely parallels the policies underlying American
copyright law. The stated intent in droit de suite is analogous to the fourth
factor of the fair use doctrine.
The droit de suite concept is primarily concerned with visual artists
who generally work in media in which unique pieces are created, and by
virtue of their uniqueness are thought to be more valuable. Copyright laws
123. Monroe E. Price, Government Policy and Economic Security for Artists: The Case of
the Droit de Suite, 77 YALE L.J. 1333 (1968).
124. Id. at 1334.
125. Copyright Office Report Executive Summary, Droit de Suite: The Artist's Resale
Royalty 2 (1992) [hereinafter Copyright Report].
126. Price, supra note 123, at 1335.
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do not adequately protect the economic interests of visual artists as they do
for authors and composers because visual artists typically create singular
works. 127 In visual arts, there is no well-developed and widely followed
system of licensing and royalties as in the publishing and music industries.
Due to the nature of visual art works, it is crucial to protect the means from
which artists may derive their income. This includes not only a right to
royalties, but also giving artists opportunities to exploit their works through
reproductions and derivative works.
Currently, California is the only state with a resale royalty statute for
visual works of art. 12  The crux of the statute, providing for a percentage
return on future sales, is found in California Civil Code § 986,
subsection (a):
Whenever a work of fine art is sold and the seller resides in
California or the sale takes place in California, the seller or the
seller's agent shall pay to the artist of such work of fine art or to
such artist's agent 5 percent of the amount of such sale. The
right of the artist to receive an amount equal to 5 percent of the
amount of such sale may be waived only by a contract in writing
providing for an amount in excess of 5 percent of the amount of
such sale. An artist may assign the right to collect the royalty
payment provided by this section to another individual or entity.
However, the assignment shall not have the effect of creating a
waiver prohibited by this subdivision.1
2 9
This type of legislation furthers the congressional intent behind the 1976
Act. Protecting the economic rights of artists serves the common good by
creating an atmosphere in which artists can be sure to gain the economic
benefit of their works as they are recognized in the market. The California
127. William A. Carleton, 111, Note, Copyright Royalties for Visual Artists: A Display-
Based Alternative to the Droit de Suite, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 510, 514 n.9 (1991) (quoting John
B. Koegel, VLA Perspectives: Memorandum of Support for S. 2796: Introduced in the 99th
Congress by Senator Edward M Kennedy (D. Mass.), II COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 347, 349
(1987): "Unfortunately, the intrinsic nature of distribution for most pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works is different [from works of writers, composers, choreographers, performing
artists and filmmakers]. Since, as a practical matter, reproductions are not significantly
marketable, the visual artist must gain his entire return from the initial, one time sale.").
128. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West 1982 & Supp. 1996). Puerto Rico also has a statute that
addresses resale royalties. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 1401 (1993).
129. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1996). Subsection (b) lists those
circumstances under which the royalty does not apply including: (1) the first sale of the work
from artist to buyer; (2) works selling for less than $1000; (3) works after the death of the artist;
and (4) sales for less than the seller's purchase price. Id. § 986(b).
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statute also mirrors the 1976 Act by limiting the term to the life of the artist
plus a stated number of years.130
Like the 1976 Act, the California statute has inspired its share of
controversy. In Morseburg v. Baylon, the statute was challenged as being
unconstitutional and preempted by the federal copyright laws,' 31 but was
upheld. To date, no federal resale royalty legislation has passed.
132
Perhaps this is because the art world itself seems conflicted as to whether
such legislation would enhance the art market, or act as a market
deterrent. 133 However, the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 did include a
provision to establish a study on the feasibility of implementing legislation
providing for resale royalty. 134 The Copyright Office, in conjunction with
the Chair of the National Endowment for the Arts, explored the national
implementation of legislation to protect the economic interests of artists.'
35
The study suggested that although the European Community had not settled
on a consistent policy for handling resale royalties, the United States might
wish to seriously consider legislation harmonious with European
standards. 136 Other suggestions included a broader right of public display,
a commercial rental right, a system of compulsory licensing, and the
financial promotion of art by the federal government through grants and
purchases of art for federal buildings. 137 These suggestions underscore the
need to protect and promote the economic rights of artists.
130. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a)(7) (stating: "Upon the death of an artist, the rights and
duties created under this section shall inure to his of her heirs, legatees, or personal
representative, until the 20th anniversary of the death of the artist.").
131. 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1990).
132. Several times bills have been introduced that included resale royalty provisions but
were ultimately defeated or deleted from the final piece of legislation. See Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 3221 Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. (1988) and
Visual Artists' Residual Rights Act, H.R. 11403, 95th Cong. (1978).
133. H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 23 (1990) ("H.R. 3221, introduced in the 100th Congress,
granted authors the rights of attribution and integrity, but it also provided that artists could share
in any profits from resale of their works. This was a controversial provision, which was not
included in H.R. 2690.") (footnote omitted); MALARO, supra note 42, at 123 ("It became
apparent that the art community was deeply divided on the merits of the legislation.").
134. Act of Dec. 1, 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, Sec. 8(b) (Studies by Copyright
Office).
135. Copyright Report, supra note 125, at 1.
136. Id. at 10.
137. Id. at 10- 11.
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VI. MORAL RIGHTS
The idea of moral rights in art is fairly new in the United States. The
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990138 was the first federal enactment
granting personal rights to artists as derived from the European concept.
139
Moral rights are described both as personal rights and natural rights. These
rights are thought to spring from the personality of the artist and her actions
in creating the work. Additionally, these personal rights are thought to
precede the economic rights of artists, and to be the basis on which
economic rights are granted to the artist.1 4 1  The Nimmer treatise on
copyright describes these moral rights as:
the right to be known as the author of his work; the right to
prevent others from falsely attributing to him the authorship of
work which he has not in fact written; the right to prevent others
from being named as the author of his work .. . the right to
prevent others from using the work or the author's name in such
a way as to reflect adversely on his professional standing ... the
right to prevent others from making deforming changes in his
work . . . the right to withdraw a published work from
distribution if it no longer represents the view of the
author .... 142
While these rights are grounded in the personality of the artist and are
arguably inherent in the creation of a work of art, it cannot be denied that
these rights also relate to the economic value of those works. The right to
prevent others from using an artist's work in a way that reflects poorly on
her professional reputation is tied to the economic value of that reputation.
California's art preservation provision 143 prohibits anyone other than the
artist from committing "physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or
destruction of a work of fine art."'144  The provision allows the artist to
138. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
139. Several states have statutes addressing one or more of the rights generally thought of as
moral rights, including: California, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. Thomas J. Davis, Jr., Fine Art and Moral Rights:
The Immoral Triumph of Emotionalism, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 317, 326-47 (1989).
140. See generally Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A
Comparison of Artists' Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1
(1980).
141. Id at 5.
142. 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 821[A], at 8-
247 (1987).
143. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 1982 & Supp. 1996).
144. Id. § 987 (c)(1).
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claim or disclaim a work,145 and permits an artist to seek an injunction,
actual and punitive damages, and attorney's fees.
146
These remedies indicate the true economic nature of the right.
Subsection (a) describes the interest: "The Legislature hereby finds and
declares that the physical alteration or destruction of fine art, which is an
expression of the artist's personality, is detrimental to the artist's
reputation, and artists therefore have an interest in protecting their works of
fine art against such alteration or destruction."' 147 Similarly, New York's
Artists' Authorship Rights Act indicates concern for the economic
detriment to an artist and finds that there have been cases where works of
art have been altered, defaced, mutilated or modified thereby destroying the
integrity of the artwork and sustaining a loss to the artist and the artist's
reputation. 
48
Economic impact is not the only factor supporting the recognition of
moral rights:
Recognition of artists' moral rights is usually urged on two
distinct grounds. The first is that the failure to attribute
authorship, the false attribution of authorship, or the alteration of
a work may interfere with a creator's ability to market his
reputation and talent. This is a purely economic argument,
grounded in the adverse impact on the creator's ability to fully
exploit the monetary reward of creativity. The second is that
interference with moral rights is offensive to the artist and
constitutes an insult to his person.149
Both justifications support the argument that an artist should have full
control over the ability to terminate an earlier imprudent grant of rights to
prepare derivative works when that work of visual art is now being used
solely as a commercial product. The artist, now knowing the full value of
her exploited work, should be able to reap the economic benefits of her
work. Furthermore, she may be offended to find her work plastered all
over T-shirts and posters. 1
50
145. Id. § 987 (d).
146. Id. § 987 (e)(l)-(4).
147. Id § 987 (a).
148. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW, § 14.03(1) (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1996).
149. Davis, supra note 139, at 320 (footnotes omitted).
150. Pablo Picasso reportedly carefully guarded the associated copyrights to his works.
Andy Warhol, on the other hand, became well known for the commercialization and reproduction
of his works. Similarly, Keith Haring's works emphasizing wiry stick figures are mass produced
on everything from notecards to animated commercials. In contrast, one must wonder if Janis
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VII. CONCLUSION
Visual artists are at a distinct disadvantage when attempting to guard
their economic rights in their works. The Copyright Act of 1976 sought to
remedy the imbalance of power and uncertainty regarding the value of
unexploited works through the termination clause of 17 U.S.C. § 203.'s1
While the exception for derivative works in the termination clause is
arguably appropriate for works such as motion pictures, which have
inherent artistic, transformative value, the exception undermines the
underlying policy of copyright when it allows museums to reap profits
from derivative works with no independent artistic value. The related
doctrines of fair use, droit de suite, and moral rights all evince the policy of
copyright, which is to protect the economic interests of artists in order to
promote creation. In light of the foregoing discussion, copyright law
would become more coherent if courts and Congress prohibit the
application of the derivative works exception to works with no independent
artistic value, such as those typically found in museum gift shops.
Joplin would feel outrage that her song, "Lord, Won't You Buy Me a Mercedes-Benz?," is being
used to sell Mercedes' cars in television commercials.
151. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1994).
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